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DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER
EDUCATION: MERGER AS A REMEDY
Geier v. University of Tennessee
597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 180 (1979)
Twenty-six years have passed since the United States Supreme
Court declared in Brown v. Board of EducationI that segregation of
public school children on the basis of race was violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 In 1955, a year fol-
lowing the historic Brown I decision, the Court in Brown ff3 first con-
sidered the complex issue of the relief to be granted black students
denied equal protection as a result of public school segregation. The
Court required school districts to make "a prompt and reasonable
start' 4 towards establishing a nondiscriminatory system.
After a decade of relative inaction on the part of school authori-
ties, the obligation to desegregate school systems once segregated by
law greatly expanded as the courts vested local officials with affirmative
duties to initiate desegregation/integration plans at the elementary and
secondary levels. In the area of public higher education, however,
many southern university systems remained marked by racial separa-
tion,5 and the nature and scope of a state's duty to remedy this situation
had not been clearly delineated by the courts.
Thirteen years after Brown II directed officials of segregated
school districts to proceed to dismantle them with "all deliberate
speed,"'6 the only step taken by Tennessee authorities to dismantle the
dual system of public higher education had been to initiate a policy of
open admissions; a policy which produced little in the way of results.
In 1968, approximately eleven percent of the 57,000 students attending
Tennessee's public universities were black.7 Despite an official open-
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. The Court rejected the "separate but equal doctrine" in public education by asserting that
separate educational facilities were inherently unequal. Id. at 495.
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
4. Id. at 300.
5. In 1970, the Department of Health, Education & Welfare [hereinafter referred to as
HEW] concluded that ten southern states were operating segregated systems of higher education.
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Tennessee was not one of the states
cited due to the fact that its university system was already under a court order to desegregate.
Brief for the United States, Plaintiff-Appellee at 27 n.97, Geier v. University of Tennessee, 597
F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 180 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
6. 349 U.S. at 301.
7. Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937, 940 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
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door policy of admissions, the formerly white institutions had black
enrollments varying between six-tenths of one percent to a high of
about seven percent. On the other hand, the traditional black school,
Tennessee State University, 8 located in Nashville, retained a black en-
rollment in excess of ninety-nine percent.9
Between 1968 and 1977, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee attempted to deal with the manifold
problems of eliminating the vestiges of state-imposed segregation, l0
with particular emphasis on Nashville where both Tennessee State
University and an extension of the predominantly white University of
Tennessee were situated. The protracted litigation concerning the af-
firmative measures to be taken to remedy the Nashville situation
culminated in 1979 in a decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, Geier v. University of Tennessee,I which affirmed
the district court's order to merge Tennessee State University and Uni-
versity of Tennessee at Nashville.
This case comment will focus on the Sixth Circuit's opinion in
Geier. The comment will attempt to place the decision in perspective
through a brief review of the pertinent desegregation cases and back-
ground of the Nashville litigation. The Geier holding will then be
presented and analyzed. It will be shown that, as a matter of law, the
affirmative duty to desegregate officially established dual systems of ed-
ucation extends to institutions of higher learning, and that when this
duty is not met, the courts may use their equitable powers to fashion
appropriate relief. This comment will question the rationale and scope
of the merger order, particularly in relation to the dilemma posed when
desegregation requirements may serve to endanger the valued role of
8. In 1968, Tennessee State University was known as Tennessee Agricultural & Industrial
State University. To prevent confusion, however, Tennessee State University will be used in the
text of this comment. Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 4 n. 12.
9. In 1968, the percentage of black students in Tennessee's public universities was as fol-
lows:
University Percent Black
Austin Peay State University 6.7
East Tennessee State University 1.1
Memphis State University 7.6
Middle Tennessee State University 1.5
Tennessee State University 99.4
Tennessee Technical University 0.6
University of Tennessee 1.2
Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 5-6.
10. Compulsory racial segregation in Tennessee was mandated by the 1870 Constitution.
TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 12 (1870).
11. 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 180 (1979).
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black colleges and universities. Finally, this comment will consider the
probable impact of the Geier decision on other historically segregated
public college systems.
DESEGREGATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY: AN OVERVIEW OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Although the Supreme Court in Brown II had ordered the elimi-
nation of racial segregation in public schools, it proposed neither stan-
dards by which to measure compliance nor a time framework other
than "all deliberate speed."' 2 As a consequence of active southern
resistance to any type of desegregation and a lack of judicial guidelines,
the period between 1954 and 1968 was characterized by evasive and
delaying tactics in the implementation of desegregation. 13 In 1968, the
Court articulated, in Green v. County School Board,14 the goal and stan-
dard by which a state's fulfillment of its duty under the equal protec-
tion clause was to be measured: complete integration and transition "to
a unitary, non-racial system of public education."1 5 School boards
were charged with an affirmative duty to produce plans that realisti-
cally worked to eliminate "root and branch" state imposed systems of
public education.' 6
The nature and scope of desegregation remedies were specifically
addressed by the Supreme Court in two key decisions. In the first,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,'7 the Court estab-
12. 349 U.S. at 294-301. One of the first federal district court decisions to interpret Brown I
declared that integration was not required: "all that [Brown I] has decided, is that a state may not
deny to any person on account of race the right to attend any school that it maintains .... The
Constitution ... does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid
such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action." Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776,
777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
13. See generally Note, The Affirmative Duty to Integrate in Higher Education, 79 YALE L.J.
666, 667-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as The Affirmative Duty to Integrate]. Some of the forms of
southern resistance were freedom of choice plans, tuition grants to private schools, school closings,
and student transfer privileges. See Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation, in POLITICS AND
THE WARREN COURT 3-48 (1965); Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV.
237 (1968).
14. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green, the Court held that the freedom of choice plan adopted by
New Kent County, Virginia was unacceptable because the dual system had not been effectively
abolished. Id. at 441. The two county public schools remained racially segregated. During the
three years that New Kent County had operated under a freedom-of-choice plan, eighty-five per-
cent of the black pupils remained in all-black schools, and no white pupil had chosen to attend the
former black school. Id. at 430. In the Court's view, such plans, where they failed to result in a
unitary, nonracial system, were not to be regarded as ends in themselves but rather one of the
means to undo segregation. If they failed to accomplish this, other means were to be sought. Id.
at 440-42.
15. Id. at 436.
16. Id. at 437-42.
17. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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lished guidelines to assist the district courts in fashioning remedies
where school authorities failed to adopt and effectuate adequate deseg-
regation plans. This decision asserted the broad power of the district
courts to design remedies that would assure a unitary school system.' 8
The scope of the remedial action was to be determined by the nature of
the violation.19
The nature of the violation became the Court's focus in the second
major opinion involving appropriate desegregation remedies, Milliken
v. Bradley.20 Here, for the first time,21 the Supreme Court considered a
remedy that extended beyond a single school district.22 In striking
down a metropolitan-wide interdistrict order designed to promote
school integration, the Court held that an interdistrict remedy could
not be imposed unless the violations within one district produced "a
significant segregative effect in another district. '23
The Brown, Green, Swann, and Milliken decisions, as well as the
great majority of cases involving school desegregation, dealt with ele-
mentary and secondary school districts. However, despite the fact that
the Supreme Court has not delivered a full opinion on the extension of
Green and Swann to higher education, it has never specifically ex-
empted colleges and universities from the affirmative duty imposed at
the lower school levels.24 The expression used by the Court in its
18. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school officials had been unable to formulate an acceptable
desegregation plan. As a result, the district court appointed an expert in educational administra-
tion and approved his plan which involved the pairing and clustering of schools, id. at 8-10, and
the busing of students. Id. at 30. The Supreme Court addressed the scope of judicial remedies at
great length. Lower courts were permitted to use mathematical ratios as a starting point in shap-
ing a remedy, but not as an inflexible requirement. Id. at 25. School officials had the burden of
satisfying the court that the continued existence of one race schools within their district was not
the result of present or past discriminatory action. Id. at 26. Alteration of attendance zones was a
permissible method of achieving nondiscriminatory pupil assignment. Id. at 28. Consideration of
future construction as well as the closing of old schools were found to be properly within the scope
of a remedial order. Id. at 20-2 1.
19. Id. at 16.
20. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
21. Id. at 744. Previously, the Supreme Court had decided that state or local officials could
not manipulate school boundary districts so as to create smaller districts from school systems
under desegregation orders where the effect would be to hinder desegregation in the remainder of
the county. See United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v.
Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
22. The district court's order would have effectively necessitated the consolidation of De-
troit's school district with fifty-three other districts in the metropolitan area. 418 U.S. at 743.
23. Id. at 744-45. The record before the Court contained evidence of de jure segregation only
in the Detroit schools. Therefore, to impose a remedy on the outlying districts was wholly imper-
missible in the opinion of the Court. Id. at 745.
24. It was, in fact, in the sphere of higher education that the judicial attack on "separate but
equal" began in 1938. See The Affirmative Duty to Integrate, supra note 13, at 669-71. The princi-
ples of Brown I were quickly extended to higher education when the Court affirmed a ruling that a
state must have a nondiscriminatory admissions policy. Frasier v. Board of Trustees, 134 F. Supp.
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Brown and Green decisions was simply "public education." 25
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION:
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CASES
The federal district courts, on the few occasions that they have
considered the issue of segregated public higher education, have ex-
pressed divergent views over the extent of the duty to go beyond the
establishment of open admissions policies. Judicial reluctance to be-
come involved in remedying these situations was accompanied by a
noticeable absence, until 1978, of any HEW desegregation guidelines
under title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 26 regarding federally as-
sisted university programs.
The first court to grapple with the scope of the affirmative duty to
desegregate institutions of higher learning was the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Alabama in Alabama State Teach-
ers Association v. Alabama Public Schools & College Authority.27 In
ASTA, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the state from the proposed con-
struction and operation of a degree-granting extension of Auburn Uni-
versity in the city of Montgomery. Plaintiffs alleged that consideration
had not been given to the probable effect of this action upon the elimi-
nation of Alabama's dual university system, and that the construction
of a branch of predominantly white Auburn would increase the racial
disparity between Auburn and predominantly black Alabama State
College, also located in Montgomery. 28 The ASTA court acknowl-
edged its competancy to review decisions concerning the impact of site
selection for new school construction or expansion upon desegregation
at the elementary and secondary levels; however, it concluded that
courts should not become involved in this type of educational policy
589, 592-93 (M.D.N.C. 1955), aff'dper curiam, 350 U.S. 979 (1956). "There is nothing in the
quoted statements of the [U.S. Supreme Court) to suggest that the reasoning does not apply with
equal force to colleges as to primary schools." 134 F. Supp. at 592. See also Lucy v. Adams, 350
U.S. 1 (1955).
25. Brown I spoke of "separate but equal" as having no place "in the field of public educa-
tion." 347 U.S. at 495. The Green Court spoke of a "unitary, nonracial system of public educa-
tion" as the ultimate goal. 391 U.S. at 436.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). For the regulations, see 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.13 (1979) and
compare with the HEW guidelines for elementary and secondary education at 45 C.F.R. § 181
(1967). See also notes 175-81 and accompanying text infra.
27. 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aj7'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969). It was not,
however, the first time that the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
had dealt with the issue of segregated colleges. The court had previously recognized an affirma-
tive duty to dismantle the dual system by requiring state colleges to refrain from discrimination in
admissions and to begin to desegregate their faculties. See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ.,
267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), afl'dsub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
28. 289 F. Supp. at 789.
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decision at the university level. In the opinion of the ASTA court, the
scope of the affirmative duty to desegregate should not be extended as
far at the university level.29
According to the ASTA court, nondiscriminatory admission and
employment policies promulgated and administered in good faith
alone satisfy the affirmative duty in higher education.30 The decision
stressed the substantial differences between elementary and secondary
school systems and those of higher education. Up to the college level,
public schools are free and compulsory, and one school is basically
similar to another in terms of goals, courses, facilities, and teacher
training. Higher education, however, is neither free nor compulsory,
and offers enormous diversity in all of these areas. 31 The court also
noted that freedom to choose one's college has had a long tradition and
performs an important function by fitting the right school to a particu-
lar student. 32 The court expressed the belief that the problem of racial
imbalance in higher education would be resolved when effective deseg-
regation plans were developed at the lower school levels.33 On appeal
to the Supreme Court in 1969, ASTA was summarily affirmed in a
memorandum decision with two Justices dissenting.34
This limited view of the scope of remedial action at the university
level was rejected by a three judge district court in Norris v. State Coun-
cil of Higher Education.35 The plaintiffs in Norris charged that Vir-
ginia continued to operate a racially identifiable dual system of higher
education and sought to enjoin the escalation of predominantly white
Bland College from a two-year to a four-year school. The plaintiffs
contended that such escalation would lead to a duplication of offerings
and frustrate efforts of neighboring predominantly black Virginia State
College to desegregate. 36 The court granted the injunction, but refused
to require a merger of the two schools on the basis that Bland provided
29. Id. at 787-88.
30. Id. at 789-90.
31. Id. at 788.
32. Id. at 790.
33. Id.
34. Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Schools & College Auth., 393 U.S. 400
(1969). Justice Douglas, in his dissent, said that the delineation between lower and higher educa-
tion in terms of the duty to desegregate was an "amazing statement" insofar as the forerunners of
Brown I were cases involving institutions of higher education. Id. at 402 n.2. (Douglas, J., dis-
senting.)
35. 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va.), qfl'dper curiam sub noma. Board of Visitors v. Norris, 404
U.S. 907 (1971).
36. 327 F. Supp. at 1369. The court pointed out that if Bland were to become a four-year
college, white students, many of whom went to Virginia State after two years at Bland, would be
more likely to seek degrees from the identifiably "white" school. Id. at 1371.
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a useful function as a two-year college and had not demonstrated a
need for additional facilities.37 The court also refused to grant the
plaintiffs' request for an order directing state authorities to submit a
plan for the desegregation of Virginia's universities and colleges. With-
out commenting on the merits of this request, the court denied the re-
lief on procedural grounds. 38
In reaching its decision, the Norris court refused to accept ASTA's
distinction between the extent of the duties entailed in the desegrega-
tion of higher and lower education. Instead, it held that the Supreme
Court's positive mandate in Green v. County School Board39 to take
affirmative action to eliminate dual educational systems "defined a
constitutional duty owed as well to college students. ' 40 Although the
means of achieving this may differ, the duty of the state is as exacting.
Thus, the court concluded that if admissions programs have not abol-
ished the racial identity of its colleges, the state must look to other rem-
edies.4 1
Addressing the argument that the ASTA decision, summarily af-
firmed by the Supreme Court, was the controlling law of the case, the
court attempted to distinguish the facts in that situation from those in
Virginia.42 The court further asserted that it did not believe that the
silent affirmance of ASTA in a one sentence memorandum decision by
the Supreme Court indicated approval of every statement in the district
court's opinion: removed from its context, the ASTA holding did not
provide a universal definition of a state's duty to abolish its dual sys-
tems of higher education.43 The ambiguity which is always inherent in
summary affirmances44 was highlighted when the Supreme Court af-
37. Id. In fact, Virginia State did not press for a merger. Id. at 1373.
38. The plaintiffs had requested the governor and the State Council of Higher Education to
prepare such a plan, but the court found that control of the colleges was vested in each college's
board of visitors. Relief was denied because the proper parties had not been sued. Id.
39. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
40. 327 F. Supp. at 1373.
41. Id.
42. The attempt to distinguish the cases was not particularly convincing. The court in Norris
suggested that in the ASTA situation the proposed branch of Auburn was to be a "new school"
and, therefore, had no racial identification. The record in ASTA simply did not support plaintiffs'
speculations that the new branch would be primarily for white students. Id. at 1372. The fact that
Alabama State did have a racial identification was ignored by the Norris court as well as the fact
that Auburn, itself, was identifiably white. The situation in Norris was viewed differently by the
court. According to the court in Norris, expansion of the already existing Bland College, identifi-
ably "white," would largely duplicate the offerings of "black" Virginia State. The two cases were
further distinguished by the Norris court on the basis that in AST4 the court found both the state
and Auburn to have been acting in good faith in complying with a court order to integrate its
faculty. Id.
43. Id.
44. A summary afflirmance of an appeal before the Supreme Court is a disposition on the
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firmed Norris, also without opinion, in 1971.
THE HISTORY OF THE GEIER LITIGATION
Sanders v. Ellington
In order to understand, as well as to evaluate, the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Geier v. University of Tennessee, it is essential to review the
series of opinions and orders rendered by the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee during the eight-year span
in which it considered the problems posed by Tennessee's racially dual
system of higher education.
Sanders v. Ellington,45 handed down one month after the ASTA
ruling in 1968,46 was the first decision in the protracted Geier litiga-
tion,47 and one that represented a far different approach to the problem
of segregated public universities than that taken by the Alabama court.
Plaintiff Geier (nee Sanders), along with other private plaintiffs,4 8
filed the action seeking to enjoin the identifiably white University of
Tennessee from constructing a new facility for the expansion of its
merits and, as such, is considered to have precedential value. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 551 (3d ed. 1976). As viewed by the Court itself, however, summary dispositions do not
have the same precedential value as would an opinion treating the question on the merits.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). Such an affirmance leaves uncertainty as to whether
the Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning of the lower court, found that the appellant had not
met his burden of proof, or believed that the case did not at that time involve a substantial federal
question. G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 62
(8th ed. 1970). Justice Brennan spoke of the inherent ambiguity of summary dispositions: "When
presented with the contention that our unexplained dispositions are conclusively binding, puzzled
state and lower courts are left to guess as to the meaning and scope of our unexplained disposi-
tions. We ourselves have acknowledged that summary dispositions are 'somewhat opaque'...."
Colorado Springs Amusement v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 919 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the precedential aspects of summary affirmances, see Note, Summary Disposition of
Supreme Court Appeals." The Signycance of Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent,
52 B.U. L. REV. 373 (1972).
45. 288 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
46. Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Schools & College Auth., 289 F. Supp.
784 (M.D. Ala. 1968). The Supreme Court had not yet delivered its summary affirmance of
ASTA.
47. The reported district court opinions involved in this litigation were all written by Judge
Gray. They are, in addition to Sanders: Geier v. Dunn, 337 F. Supp. 573 (M.D. Tenn. 1973) and
Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644 (M.D. Tenn. 1977). The appeal of the latter ruling resulted in
the Geier v. University of Tennessee opinion.
48. The original plaintiffs were: a member of the faculty at Tennessee State University; a
member of the faculty of the University of Tennessese at Nashville; a black student at Tennessee
State University; a black senior student at Wilson County High School; and the father of this last
student. The defendants included the Governor of Tennessee, the chairmen of the boards of trust-
ees and administrative officials of the two universities, the Tennessee Higher Education Commis-
sion, its chairman, the chairmen of all state boards of education, HEW, and the United States
Office of Education. The action was later dismissed against the federal defendants. Sanders v.
Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937, 939 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
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Nashville center program.49 Their claims for relief were based on the
allegations that Tennessee was maintaining a segregated university sys-
tem in violation of the fourteenth amendment; that the proposed ex-
pansion of UT-N would be duplicative of programs and services
already offered at Tennessee State University, 50 an identifiably black
school also located in Nashville; and that the result of such competition
would be the perpetuation of TSU as a black institution, thus impeding
the disestablishment of the dual system of higher education.51 Soon
after the litigation commenced, the United States intervened as a party
plaintiff52 urging the court to require the state defendants to present a
plan designed to produce meaningful desegregation of Tennessee's
public universities.
Following a hearing, district court Judge Gray found that the dual
system of higher education in Tennessee had not been effectively dis-
mantled. 53 Using Green v. County School Board54 as precedent, Judge
Gray determined that there was an affirmative duty imposed upon the
state to desegregate all of its schools. According to the court, open door
university admissions policies did not, alone, discharge a state's consti-
tutional obligation where no genuine progress toward desegregation
had occurred and where there was no real prospect of progress.55 This
position was later to be cited with approval in Norris v. State Council of
Higher Education,56 although the relief granted in Sanders was consid-
erably broader insofar as the defendants were ordered to submit a com-
prehensive plan for dismantling Tennessee's dual system of higher
49. The University of Tennessee Nashville Center (hereinafter referred to as UT-N] was es-
tablished in 1947 as a segregated white school to provide evening courses for persons not able to
attend regular day classes. It also operated the school of social work for the University of Tennes-
see [hereinafter referred to as UT] as well as a two-year day program in nursing. Aside from the
nursing program, it was not a degree-granting day institution in 1968. 288 F. Supp. at 941.
50. Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644, 645 (M.D. Tenn. 1973). Tennessee State University
[hereinafter referred to as TSU] was established in 1912 to train black students in agriculture,
home economics, various trades, and to prepare teachers for the black elementary and secondary
schools in the state. ld. at 645 n.2.
51. Id. at 645. The Geier v. Blanton decision provides a better summary of the early history
of the litigation than does the Sanders opinion.
52. In 1968, the United States sought and gained intervention under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (1976). See Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937, 939 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), for
the procedural history. Richardson and additional party plaintiffs were granted leave to intervene
in 1972. The plaintiffs sought relief from alleged discrimination in Tennessee's public colleges
and sought to enjoin construction of two campuses elsewhere in the state on the grounds that these
community colleges would be racially segregated. 427 F. Supp. at 644, 648.
53. Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937, 940 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
54. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
55. 288 F. Supp. at 942.
56. 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (E.D. Va.), a Idper curiam sub nom. Board of Visitors v. Norris,
404 U.S. 907 (1971).
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education.57
Judge Gray ordered the defendants in Sanders to submit a plan
designed to effect the desegregation of the state's public universities
with particular attention to the situation at TSU where ninety-nine per-
cent of its approximately 4,300 students were black.58 He expressed the
belief that without desegregation, TSU would continue to deteriorate
as an institution of higher learning.59 However, Judge Gray refused to
enjoin UT's proposed construction since there was no indication in the
record that UT intended to make the Nashville center a degree-grant-
ing day institution 60 and, thus, bring it into direct competition with
TSU. Judge Gray specifically pointed out that his refusal to grant in-
junctive relief was not based on the recent Alabama district court's de-
cision in ASTA in which similar injunctive relief had also been
denied.6' No plan, other than an open door policy, had been formu-
lated to desegregate TSU, and the total ineffectiveness of that policy
mandated further action.
Geier v. Dunn
The first desegregation plan under Judge Gray's order was submit-
ted by the defendants in April 1969. The court found the plan lacking
in specificity and withheld its approval.62 The defendants were re-
quired to file another report showing precisely what had been accom-
plished on each item of their proposal. A year later, the new report
indicated that while substantial progress was generally being made on a
state-wide scale in attracting blacks to the state colleges, 63 the plan had
57. It should be recalled that the Norris court did not order the desegregation of Virginia
State College, nor did it grant the plaintiff's request for submission of a state-wide plan. See notes
35-38 supra and accompanying text.
58. 288 F. Supp. at 940.
59. Id. at 943.
60. Id. at 941.
61. Id. at 942. See Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Schools & College Auth.,
289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
62. The plan submitted on April 1, 1969 relied primarily upon the efforts of each institution
to increase minority enrollment. The plan stated the defendants' commitment to increase the
number of black students in the state's traditionally white institutions, to provide financial aid for
black students, to recruit both white students and white faculty at TSU, to upgrade TSU's physical
appearance, and to give attention to developing and publicizing academic programs which would
attract white students to TSU. Geier v. Dunn, 337 F. Supp. 573, 574 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
63. The report of April I, 1970 stated that the number of black students enrolled in Tennes-
see's public colleges and universities (exclusive of TSU) had increased 42.2 percent, from 2,720
students to 3,869, between the academic year 1968-69 and the academic year 1969-70. There had
also been an increase of 53 percent in the amount of financial aid utilized by black students. Less
satisfactory results were shown, however, in the increase of black faculty members in the former
white institutions. This figure showed a rise of only 0.5 percent. 337 F. Supp. at 575.
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been ineffective regarding desegregation of TSU.64 Subsequent reports
and hearings65 before the court revealed that the original state plan had
no prospect of working. Following a hearing on the progress to date,
Judge Gray issued a memorandum opinion in 1972, Geier v. Dunn.66
In Geier v. Dunn, the court again rejected the defendants' conten-
tion, based upon ASTA, that a good faith open admission policy satis-
fies fourteenth amendment requirements.67 Norris v. State Council of
Higher Eduation68 had been decided by this time, and Judge Gray was
evidently concerned with resolving the dilemma posed by the Supreme
Court's silent affirmances of both ASTA and Norris with their contra-
dictory views regarding the sufficiency of open-admissions policies. He
concluded that both decisions were actually consistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education69 which emphasized the broad range of an equity court's
power to fashion a remedy which, balances the interests to be protected
against the nature of the violation. Judge Gray believed that the ASTA
court, on the basis of the evidence before it, decided that Alabama edu-
cational officials had considered the impact of the new construction on
the dual system and that, under the circumstances, to substitute the
court's judgment for that of the state officials would have been pre-
sumptuous. 70 He noted ASTA's express recognition of the affirmative
duty to dismantle the dual university system and asserted that the
ASTA court evidently felt that the open door policy would bring about
such a result. If, however, the preferred open-admissions approach
were to fail, Judge Gray had no doubt that the interests of the state in
establishing its own educational policy would be outweighed by consti-
tutional dictates.71
In Geier v. Dunn, Judge Gray's attention was focused on TSU.
64. White enrollment at TSU had decreased from forty-five to forty-four students, and one
additional white faculty member had joined the staff. Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644, 647
(M.D. Tenn. 1977).
65. The plaintiffs filed a motion on June 3, 1970 contending that the defendants had not set
forth a plan for the dismantling of the dual system of public higher education. The defendants
filed another progress report on June 14, 1971 which again emphasized the efforts of the individ-
ual institutions to solve the problem. However, as of 1972, the freshman class at TSU was 99.9
percent black. Geier v. Dunn, 337 F. Supp. 573, 575-76 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
66. 337 F. Supp. 573 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
67. Id. at 580.
68. 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va.), afdper curiam sub nom. Board of Visitors v. Norris, 404
U.S. 907 (1971).
69. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
70. 337 F. Supp. at 579. See Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Schools &
College Auth., 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
71. 337 F. Supp. at 580.
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Since 1968, the court had pursued a two-pronged approach with regard
to the state's dual higher educational system: one prong dealt with the
state-wide system composed of predominantly white institutions, the
other with the Nashville situation.72 Outside of Nashville, Judge Gray
found the defendants to be making progress towards desegregation at
an acceptable rate of speed.73 The exception to this was the phenome-
non of a black TSU which negated the defendants' contention that the
dual system was being dismantled.74 Aware that, as a practical matter,
affirmative remedies at the college level would differ from those in the
sphere of lower education,75 the court ordered the defendants to submit
a plan within six weeks which, at a minimum, would allocate programs
to the TSU campus sufficient to ensure a substantial white presence on
that campus by the beginning of the next academic year, September
1972.76 The court recognized that compliance with this order would
not adequately desegregate TSU and, therefore, further ordered the
consideration of additional methods, the report of which was to be pre-
pared within six months. The defendants were directed to specifically
consider the feasibility of a consolidation or merger of TSU and UT-N,
as well as the feasibility of a consolidation of undergraduate and grad-
uate curricula of the state's colleges in the general Nashville area.77
Geier v. Blanton
Following the 1972 memorandum opinion and order, additional
party plaintiffs were given permission to intervene.78  The defendants
filed new proposals for desegregating both the faculty and student body
of TSU.79 Further reports indicated that progress at TSU remained
minimal. As a result, the court ordered defendants to submit an in-
72. See Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644, 650 n.14 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
73. 337 F. Supp. at 580.
74. Id. at 576.
75. In the situation involving colleges, a court cannot order the transfer of faculty or of stu-
dents from one institution to another because students at the college level are free to leave and go
wherever they wish. Id. at 579.
76. Id. at 581.
77. Id. at 581-82. As far as the record shows, the possibility of curriculum consolidation was
never included in the defendants' proposals, although on appeal the defendants did suggest a
geographical assignment plan involving TSU and other universities in the area excluding UT-N.
See note 166 infra.
78. See note 52 supra.
79. The plan provided for the appointment of white faculty members to fill vacancies at TSU
unless superior black applicants were available, the addition of white faculty members to teach
courses of particular interest to white students, the general improvement of TSU facilities, and the
transfer of a social work program "physically" from UT-N to TSU. Geier v. University of Ten-
nessee, 597 F.2d 1056, 1060 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 180 (1979).
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terim plan ready for implementation in the 1974-75 school year. 0
This interim plan, proposed by the Tennessee Higher Education
Commission and the State Board of Regents, TSU's governing board,
admitted the inability of the two universities to reach agreement and
contained a statement recommending court action to bring about some
exclusive program allocations to TSU.' l During 1974-76, plaintiffs and
defendants submitted long-range plans8 2 and progress reports to the
court, but the lack of success in eliminating the dual system in Nash-
ville remained evident. The enrollment at TSU in 1976 was eighty-five
percent black and twelve and one-half percent white, with almost half
of the white students taking courses off-campus. Black enrollment at
UT-N was slightly more than twelve percent. 83 In June 1976, the court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and set the case
for hearing final proof on the progress to date and prospects for the
future.84
After reviewing the final report,8 5 Judge Gray, in 1977, wrote a
second memorandum opinion, Geier v. Blanton.8 6 He concluded that,
after eight years, the defendants' approaches to the problem had
neither worked nor offered any real hope for progress in the future.8 7
After the litigation began, UT-N developed into a four-year, degree-
granting institution and had fostered competition with TSU for white
students, thus impeding efforts to dismantle the dual system 8 "Radi-
cal remedies" were now needed. Therefore, Judge Gray ordered a
merger of the two schools as proposed by the plaintiffs, under the gov-
80. Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644, 648 (M.D. Tenn. 1973).
8 1. The interim plan stated that, due to the lack of agreement as to UT's future role in Nash-
ville, the defendants had been unable to reach interim accords regarding program allocations,
cooperative programs, or other joint endeavors. Id. In 1974, the court did order exclusive alloca-
tion of graduate education courses to TSU. Id. at 649.
82. The defendants' long-range plan proposed the continuation of joint and cooperative pro-
grams between the two schools and projected goals and timetables for black student enrollment.
The long-range plan of the original plaintiffs proposed the absorption of UT-N by TSU. The
United States also called for the merger of the two institutions under the dominance of TSU over
a period of five years. ld. at 649.
83. Id. at 652.
84. Id. at 649-50.
85. The final progress report of February 1976 showed that the enrollment at TSU was 85
percent black and about 12.2 percent white, although the proportion of whites on the main cam-
pus remained at 7 percent due to the fact that almost half of TSU's white students were taking
courses at off-campus centers. Faculty desegregation had made little progress. In addition, 68.8
percent of TSU's faculty was black. Id. at 652.
86. 427 F. Supp. 644 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
87. Id. at 657.
88. UT-N still operated primarily, however, as a part-time, degree-granting, evening school,
but the court believed that much of the enrollment at both schools was a vestige of former segrega-
tion and that TSU must attract the white adult evening student to UT-N if it were to prosper. Id.
at 653.
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ernance of TSU's governing board, the State Board of Regents. 89
In support of the merger remedy, Judge Gray relied upon expert
testimony, including that offered by the defendants' own experts.90 All
of the witnesses believed that merger constituted an acceptable means
of desegregating the Nashville area, and most of them viewed merger
as the best long range solution. Furthermore, most of the witnesses
believed that one institution of higher education in Nashville would
eventually evolve. 91 There was little testimony given in support of a
merger under the UT Board of Trustees, and the court felt that neither
the record nor the historical facts would justify such a result. 92 TSU
was a university with a sixty-one year history and a merger under the
control of UT would eliminate TSU as an educational institution "with
all the concomitant losses entailed therein. '93
The merger was to take effect by July 1, 1980. 94 Admitting that
merger was a drastic remedy, the court found that such action did not
exceed the state's "egregious examples of constitutional violations."9 5
The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Geier-v. University of Tennessee96 where the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court decision.
GEIER v UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DECISION
The Majority Opinion: Affirmance of the District Court
When the appeal of Geier v. Blanton came before the Sixth Circuit,
89. Control of Tennessee's public institutions of higher education has not been under a single
governing body in recent years. In 1972, the Tennessee legislature created the State Board of
Regents which governs regional and community colleges. TSU has been under the authority of
the State Board of Regents while UT has been governed by its own board. The Tennessee Higher
Education Commission has some authority over all public colleges and universities. Geier v. Uni-
versity of Tennessee, 597 F.2d 1056, 1058 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 180 (1979).
90. 427 F. Supp. at 657.
91. Id. at 659.
92. Id. at 660.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 661. As directed in the judgment, the State Board of Regents filed the plan of
merger on May 11, 1977. The court ordered it to be put into effect, overruling motions to strike.
The intervening plaintiffs had filed objections setting forth the inadequacy of the plan. Both par-
ties then filed notice of appeal. The appeal by the plaintiffs was primarily concerned with plans
outside the Nashville area and was treated by the Sixth Circuit in Richardson v. Blanton, 597 F.2d
1078 (6th Cir. 1979), a decision handed down the same day as Geier.
95. 427 F. Supp. at 660.
96. 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.), cer. denied, 100 S. Ct. 180 (1979). Judge Lively was joined by
Judge Peck. Judge Engel delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
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the position of the defendants/appellants 97 was basically the same as it
had been since 1968. The defendants contended that the state had met
its constitutional obligation by instituting an "open door" admissions
policy; that the present preponderance of black students at TSU re-
sulted from their own freedom of choice rather than from any current
unconstitutional state actions; that the mere fact of the existence of
predominantly black TSU was not evidence of violation; and, there-
fore, since no present violation existed, there was no authority for the
district court to impose a remedy.98
The defendants charged that the district court had applied an im-
permissible constitutional standard by concluding that the existence of
a predominantly black institution of higher education in a free-choice
system, in and of itself, created a dual system of higher education
whichoffended the Constitution. The Sixth Circuit, however, felt that
this was not an accurate statement of Judge Gray's ruling.99 Judge
Gray had found TSU to be the "heart of the dual system," a system
created originally by law and one which had not been dismantled. It
was not the existence of a black institution in and of itself which had
been held to be a continuing constitutional violation. I°°
With regard to the central issue, a state's duty to remove the ves-
tiges of state-imposed segregation, the court found the Supreme Court's
decision in Green v. County School Boardt'° to be controlling. School
boards have an "affirmative duty" to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be totally eliminated. Citing Norris
v. State Council of Higher Education10 2 for the proposition that Green
was applicable to public higher education, Judge Lively, writing for the
Sixth Circuit, suggested that he, as well as the commentators 0 3 on the
subject, had concluded that the ASTA holding was too restrictive with
97. The appellees were the original plaintiffs with the addition of the State Board of Regents,
a defendant below.
98. Geier v. University of Tennessee, 597 F.2d 1056, 1064 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
180 (1979).
99. Id. at 1065.
100. Id. Judge Gray had used the term "heart of the dual system" when referring to TSU, the
only black state college. Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644, 650 n. 14 (M.D. Tenn. 1977). As the
court stated in an earlier opinion: "IT]he phenomenon of a black Tennessee State, so long as it
exists, negates both the contention that defendants have dismantled the dual system of public
higher education. . . and the contention that they are. . . on their way toward doing so." Geier
v. Dunn, 337 F. Supp. 573, 576 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
101. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
102. 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va.), af9'dper curiam sub noma. Board of Visitors v. Norris, 404
U.S. 907 (1971).
103. See Note, Integration of Higher Education in the South, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 112 (1969);
Note, Desegregation-College's Duty to Take Affirmative Action to Integrate Beyond the Institution
ofa Non-Discriminatory Admissions Policy, 4 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs--CIv. LiB. L. REV. 443 (1969);
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regard to the sufficiency of open admissions policies. 104 Asserting the
facts in the present case to be "closely analogous" to those in Green,
where schools remained segregated despite freedom of choice plans, 0 5
the court indicated that the inaction resulting from failure of the vari-
ous desegregation plans for TSU was a violation of the Constitution. 06
Regarding the propriety of merger as a remedy, the Geier court
concurred with the findings that the rapid increase in the size of the
student body and development of UT-N into a degree-granting branch
impeded the process of desegregating TSU. 0 7 Several expert witnesses
had testified that older working students were the most likely source of
white students for a traditionally black urban university.108 Thus, al-
though primarily a night school, UT-N provided the greatest obstacle
to TSU's desegregation efforts.
Because TSU was considered to be the heart of the dual system in
Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit concurred with the district court's finding
that TSU necessitated special attention. Applying the equitable princi-
ples discussed by the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken
11),109 Judge Lively held that the merger remedy ordered by the district
court "was related to the condition found to offend the Constitution" I 10
and was within the equitable power of that court. This "condition" was
the failure to dismantle the dual system, a failure essentially due to
TSU's inability to attract white students because of the competition
from UT-N. Black students had a constitutional right to attend a uni-
tary university system, a right denied them by state action. The merger
Comment, Integrating Higher Education.- Dening the Scope of the Affirmative Duty to Integrate,
57 IowA L. REV. 898 (1972); The Affirmative Duty to Integrate, supra note 13.
104. 597 F.2d at 1065.
105. Id. at 1066. See also note 14 supra.
106. 597 F.2d at 1067.
107. Id. In the nine years following the initiation of this suit, UT-N had grown from a small
extension program of 1,788 students to a degree-granting institution of 5,828 students. Geier v.
Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644, 652 (M.D. Tenn. 1977). On October 18, 1968, two months after the
district court's first desegregation order, UT-N was authorized by the UT Board of Trustees to
grant baccalaureate degrees. Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 19.
108. 597 F.2d at 1067. In 1972, the Tennessee Higher Eduation Commission (THEC) stated:
"The only successful large scale desegregation of formerly black institutions has come by at-
tracting adult, largely part-time, commuting students, mostly enrolled in evening classes." Brief
for Appellee, supra note 5, at 19.
109. 433 U.S. 267 (1977). In Milliken 11, the Court relied on the following cases: Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (if "school authorities fail in their
affirmative obligations. . . judicial authority may be invoked" and the nature of the desegrega-
tion remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation); Milliken
v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 738-46 (1974) (the remedy must be related to "the condition
alleged to offend the Constitution" and must be remedial in nature); Brown v. Board of Educ.
(Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) ("[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility for
elucidating, assessing and solving [segregation) problems"). See 597 F.2d at 1068.
110. 597 F.2d at 1068.
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remedy would restore the victims of segregation to their "rightful
place.""'I
The appellants argued that the merger order was the equivalent of
an "interdistrict order" which had been proscribed by the Supreme
Court in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I). 1 2 Judge Lively stated that
this argument failed for two reasons. First, there was no special public
interest issue involving "local control" since the defendants in Geier
had state-wide jurisdiction over their respective systems; and second,
the Court in Milliken I provided that an interdistrict remedy might be
appropriate where discriminatory acts of one school district result in
racial segregation in an adjacent one.' 13 For the Geier court, the find-
ing that the defendants' actions perpetuated segregation in the Nash-
ville area was sufficient to uphold a Milliken I "inter-board" remedy. 114
Judge Lively also responded to the contention that UT was an "in-
nocent party" because there had been no finding that its recent actions
were designed to perpetuate segregation." 15 In Judge Lively's opinion,
this argument was without merit. De jure segregation was maintained
prior to 1960 by exclusion of whites from UT, and the duty to disman-
tle properly fell on both UT and TSU.1 6 After the initiation of open-
admissions policies, the effects of previous segregation remained; since
the policies of the UT Board of Trustees had contributed to the segre-
gated system, there was no legal reason why it should not be required
to participate in dismantling it.117 Judge Lively viewed the Sixth Cir-
cuit decision in Newburg Area Council v. Board of Education 18 as con-
111. Id. The court noted that Judge Gray had afforded the defendants nine years in which to
effectuate meaningful desegregation and had initially approved the institution ofjoint and cooper-
ative programs as suggested by the defendants. When, however, the state authorities "failed in
their affirmative obligations," the court, in accordance with Milliken I, correctly invoked its equi-
table powers. Id. Judge Lively further stated that a merger would involve the court less in day-to-
day school affairs than would an attempt at program allocations, and that compulsory pupil as-
signments would be both unworkable and unwise. Id. at 1069.
112. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
113. 597 F.2d at 1069. See also Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
114. 597 F.2d at 1070. Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may
be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-
district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one
district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district. "Specifically, it must be
shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts or of a single school
district have been a substantial cause of inter-district segregation." Id. at 1069, quoting Milliken
v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
115. 597 F.2d at 1070. In the court's view, UT appeared to argue that only the State Board of
Regents, which governed both TSU as well as all white schools, had practiced de jure segregation;
UT, it was claimed, had not engaged in such practices because it operated only the formerly all
white UT. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1070-71.
118. 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
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trolling in Geier. In Newburg, the court found that when two school
districts had committed acts of de jure segregation and had failed to
eliminate all of its vestiges, an interdistrict remedy was appropriate. 119
In its conclusion affirming the district court's holding, the Geier
majority again stressed that the defendants' insistence upon treating the
existence of TSU as an isolated unconstitutional condition was errone-
ous. TSU had been found to be the "core" of a violation permeating
the entire system. 120 The Sixth Circuit agreed with Judge Gray's deter-
mination that some progress towards desegregation was being made
state-wide, but that if the Nashville situation were rectified, greater pro-
gress throughout the system could be expected. 121
The Dissenting Opinion. Inappropriateness of the Merger Remedy
Judge Engel dissented from the majority opinion in Geier on the
basis that the merger remedy violated the principles set forth in Milli-
ken 1:122 the remedy extended beyond the constitutional wrong
ascribed to UT.123 Judge Engel agreed with the majority's view that
UT's continued expansion would place it in direct competition with
TSU 124 and with the majority's conclusion that since both university
systems had been part of a de jure segregation system, it was UT's duty
to stop impeding TSU's legitimate efforts to integrate. 125 The problem,
however, was that the remedy did not respond to the ill. Judge Engel
119. 510 F.2d at 1358-59. The court in Newburg distinguished its situation from Milliken I
where the interdistrict remedy had been held to be broader than the constitutional violation. Id.
at 1360.
120. 597 F.2d at 1071.
121. Id. The Sixth Circuit decided the issue of state-wide desegregation in the companion
case to Geier. In the companion case, Richardson v. Blanton, 597 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1979), Judge
Lively upheld the district court's finding "that desegregation was progressing at an acceptable rate
outside Nashville and that the proposed long-range plan submitted by the defendants indicated
prospects for continued progress." Id. at 1086. A plaintiff-appellant Richardson (a plaintiff-ap-
pellee in Geier) appealed from that portion of the district court's final judgment which approved
the defendants' long-range plan concerning the desegregation of higher education outside the
Nashville area. Id. at 1079.
122. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). Judge Engel stated:
The well-settled principle that the nature and scope of the remedy are to be deter-
mined by the violation means simply that federal-court decrees must directly address
and relate to the constitutional violation itself. Because of this inherent limitation upon
federal judicial authority, federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are
aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow
from such a violation.
597 F.2d at 1071 n.l, quoting Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I1), 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977).
123. 597 F.2d at 1071.
124. Judge Engel had no doubt that UT would eventually establish a four-year university
program in Nashville. Id. at 1072. UT had become a degree-granting institution in 1971. Id. at
n.3.
125. Id. at 1073 n.6.
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proposed to vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for
further proceedings in accordance with the aim of confining UT-N to
providing only such courses and activities which it offered prior to its
1969 expansion.1 26
The dissent argued that the majority was in error when it found
Newburg Area Council v. Board of Education 27 to be controlling in the
instant litigation. The Nashville situation more nearly resembled Milli-
ken I because the acts of UT, in Judge Engel's opinion, did not create
the segregation at TSU.' 28 According to Judge Engel, UT had clearly
participated in acts of de jure discrimination, and the vestiges of such
actions were properly the subject of remedial action by the court. 129
Judge Engel saw no basis, however, for concluding that in the noncom-
peting curricular areas, UT had contributed to TSU's present racial
composition. Thus, to go further than preventing UT-N from hinder-
ing TSU's desegregation efforts would result in the court's imposing a
remedy that exceeds any constitutional violation by UT or UT-N. 30
Judge Engel believed that the failure spoken of by the majority to
remove the vestiges of state-imposed segregation was actually the fail-
ure of the state to obtain for TSU a racially balanced faculty or to
persuade either black applicants to go elsewhere or white applicants to
attend TSU.13' According to the dissent, it was unfair to place the
blame solely upon UT, particularly in view of the fact that the court
had found the integration of faculty and student body at UT to be pro-
ceeding at a constitutionally permissible rate. 132
Judge Engel placed the responsibility for the failure to integrate
TSU on its own desire to retain an identity as a respected black univer-
sity. TSU's policies, themselves, served as a deterrent to attracting
white students.133 Judge Engel expressed sympathy for what he consid-
126. Id. at 1077. Judge Engel noted in his dissent that should such a solution not be amenable
to UT-N, it could always enter into an agreement with TSU similar to the one in effect in Mem-
phis, where UT voluntarily relinquished its control over a night school to the predominantly black
Memphis State University. Id. at 1076. Judge Engel believed that such voluntary action repre-
sented a "world of difference" from action required by the courts. Id.
127. 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 93 (1975).
128. Judge Engel argued that in NewburgArea Council the two districts had not only failed to
eliminate segregation but had in fact combined to perpetuate it. 597 F.2d at 1073 n.6.
129. Such action was taken by the Sixth Circuit in the companion case decided along with
Geier, Richardson v. Blanton, 597 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1979).
130. 597 F.2d at 1073 n.6.
131. Id. at 1073.
132. Id. at 1073-74. Between 1969 and 1975, black enrollment at UT had gone from 3.2 per-
cent to 6.4 percent and at UT-N from 7.4 percent to 12.7 percent. At TSU, black enrollment had
declined from 99 percent to 85 percent. Id. at 1074 n.7.
133. Id. at 1075.
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ered to be TSU's efforts to retain its black identity, noting that several
witnesses had testified as to the importance of blacks being able to cre-
ate and control strong universities which could provide opportunities to
students who might not otherwise receive a higher education. 34 Other
witnesses had spoken of the need to allow black colleges to develop
along their own lines and had expressed concern that these schools
were threatened by integration. 35
The dissent argued that it was not within the power of the court to
compel students to choose to attend a particular university. Although
the racial makeup of the enrollment at TSU should more accurately
reflect the racial population as a whole, Judge Engel would not require
it as long as the racial imbalance was the result of personal choice and
not compelled by state action. 36 By terminating UT-N's expanded
programs, competition within TSU would be significantly reduced,
thereby enabling it, through its own good faith efforts, to attract white
students. 37 Although it might take longer to achieve greater integra-
tion at TSU through this "more neutral policy," in Judge Engel's opin-
ion, it would be far more preferable both in terms of impact and
principle. 38 The pressures for a four-year university in Nashville were
evident, and white students would be persuaded to attend TSU once,
through its own policies, TSU became less identifiable as a black insti-
tution. Judge Engel believed that there were sound historical reasons
for the development of parallel systems of public higher education
throughout the United States, and usually these systems had nothing to
do with considerations of race. "Until a system itself is employed to
impose or foster segregated educational experience, its integrity should
be respected by our courts."'139
On July 1, 1979, less than three months following the Geier deci-
sion, the merger between TSU and UT-N was effectuated. 40 This fol-
134. Id. at 1075 n.9.
135. Id. HEW desegregation guidelines, promulgated in 1978, also recognized the unique im-
portance of black universities. See text accompanying note 179 infra.
136. 597 F.2d at 1077.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1076. Judge Engel suggested that if there were to be a merger at all, the logical
choice would be to have UT absorb TSU because TSU remains disproportionate racially as com-
pared to the rest of the system. Judge Engel recognized, however, the unworkability of such a
plan: faculty and admission standards vary so greatly that it would result in a genuine deprivation
of opportunity for both black staff and students. Id. at 1077. This is the sole reference to different
admission standards in any of the opinions. Admissions criteria apparently were not raised as an
issue by any of the litigants.
139. Id. at 1077.
140. The plan of merger presented by the State Board of Regents and accepted by the Geier
court provided detailed guidelines in the area of curricular requirements, faculty employment
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lowed denial of motions to stay the order brought before both the Sixth
Circuit and United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in October 1979.' 4'
ANALYSIS OF GEIER V. UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE
The Constitutional Violation
The Sixth Circuit's affirmance of the district court's findings was
consistent with legal principles enunciated by the Supreme Court on
numerous occasions. Of criticial importance in this litigation was the
fact that de jure racial segregation had been practiced in Tennessee
until 1960, some six years after Brown v. Board of Education (Brown
1) 142 A primary contention of the defendants was that UT was an
innocent party, and that the district court had never found any intent to
perpetuate segregation in its recent actions. 43
As the court in Geier correctly pointed out, UT's reliance on Wash-
ington v. Davis'44 was misplaced. Washington set forth criteria for de-
termining when unconstitutional racial discrimination has occurred in
situations of de facto, not de jure segregation. 45 The Supreme Court
has never held that post-Brown lack of discriminatory intent was suffi-
cient to overcome the affirmative duty to dismantle the dual system.
On the contrary, reaffirming the principles set forth in Green v. County
School Board146 the Court in one of its most recent decisions on the
subject, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,t47 stated that "[g]iven
rights, provisions for participation by former UT-N students in student government, and guaran-
tees of participation by former UT-N faculty in administrative and faculty committees. The plan
also provided for the newly expanded TSU to fully utilize all facilities and operate fourteen hour
per day programs. Id. at 1064.
141. 100 S. Ct. 180 (1979). Judge Engel's dissenting opinion was mentioned by UT in its
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court insofar as it supported petitioner's contention that the
remedy imposed by the majority exceeded the constitutional wrong, thus violating Milliken I prin-
ciples. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 15. UT clearly did not approve of the dissent's proposal
to restrict UT-N to those programs which it offered prior to its expansion in 1969.
142. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
143. 597 F.2d at 1070.
144. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Washington involved the validity of a qualifying test for positions in
a police department. The Court held that a law alleged to be racially discriminatory must be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. Racially discriminatory impact is not enough. 1d. at
239.
145. Id. at 240. Similarly, appellants' use of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), in their petition for certiorari was inappropriate. Arling-
ton Heights emphasized the evidentiary data relevant to finding discriminatory purpose. Courts,
however, uniformly have found the requisite discriminatory purpose in the case of state-imposed
dual educational systems.
146. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
147. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979). See also Columbus Bd. of Educ.
v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979). These companion cases were decided on July 2, 1979, three
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
intentionally segregated schools in 1954. . . the Court of Appeals was
quite right in holding that the [school] [b]oard was thereafter under a
continuing duty to eradicate the effects of that system."' 48 The Court
in Brinkman further indicated that the measure of a school board's
post-Brown conduct is the "effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions
in decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual sys-
tem." 49 Abandonment of prior discriminatory purpose is not enough.
School boards have the responsibility to see that their policies are not
used to perpetuate the dual system.
An Affirmative Duty Exists to Dismantle Dual Systems of Public
Higher Education
In determining that an affirmative duty to eliminate the present
effects of past discrimination extends to higher education, the Sixth
Circuit followed a doctrine clearly set forth in a variety of racial dis-
crimination cases dealing not only with education but housing, 150 vot-
ing,'II and employment 52 as well. There is no basis for the assumption
that public higher education is an exception to this doctrine. The
courts have recognized, however, that the nature of the remedies may
differ from those used at the elementary and secondary levels.
Both the district and appellate courts properly rejected the defend-
ants' argument, based on ASTA, 15 3 that the duty to dismantle a dual
educational system is met when an institution of higher education insti-
tutes a good faith, nondiscriminatory policy with respect to its admis-
sion of students and its hiring of faculty and staff. The position taken
months after Geier. The cases were cited in the Brief for the United States in Opposition to the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. United States Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 24. Both
desegregation orders involved Ohio districts charged with operating racially segregated systems at
the time of Brown . In neither case had the dual system been mandated by statute in 1954, thus
giving rise to an objection that the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation had been
eliminated, rendering all school systems "captives of remote and ambiguous past." Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2953 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), where Justice Rehnquist in his dissent argued that, con-
trary to situations of system-wide de jure segregation, the existence in Denver of a few racially
gerrymandered attendance boundaries did not necessitate the finding of a "dual" school system
for the entire metropolitan district. Id. at 257-58.
148. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 2979 (1979), quoting Wright v. Council
of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460 (1972).
149. Id. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200-01 (1973).
150. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
151. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
152. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
153. Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Schools & College Auth., 289 F. Supp.
784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aft'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969).
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in Geier, as well as in Norris v. State Council of Higher Education,1 54
emphasized the need to gauge the effectiveness of open-admissions
plans, not merely their existence. Aside from the dicta in the ASTA 55
opinion, a case of first impression, there is no basis for deciding that a
policy irrespective of its effectiveness will be deemed sufficient to dis-
charge the state's affirmative duties.
In the Geier litigation, the defendants urged the court to accept the
idea that freedom of choice, a recognized and important aspect of
higher education, was relevant to the question of whether continued
black predominance at TSU was in violation of the Constitution.
156
Judge Lively's affirmance of the conclusion that it was a violation was
based upon the fact that the effects of prior segregation lingered long
after the cessation of discriminatory practices.157 Freedom of choice
did not realistically exist in the Nashville area because students were
choosing, in effect, between historically one-race schools, and consider-
ing UT's prestige and TSU's black history, students were presented
with a "loaded game board."' 58 Their choice was not truly free or just
coincidental, but was rather predetermined by past segregation.1
5 9
Such a situation required affirmative action.
The Merger Remedy
One argument concerning the imposition of a merger was that it
was a cross-district remedy forbidden by Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken
f).160 The Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that Judge Gray's order
was within the ambit of permissible interdistrict remedies based upon
the finding that the actions of UT had perpetuated segregation by
154. 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va.), affdper curiam sub nom. Board of Visitors v. Norris, 404
U.S. 907 (1971). See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
155. Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Schools & College Auth., 289 F. Supp.
784, 787 (M.D. Ala. 1968), a#dper curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969). The court stated that it was
"reluctant at this time to go much beyond preventing discriminatory admissions." 289 F. Supp. at
787. One might, therefore, draw the conclusion that the ASTA court in proper circumstances
would, in fact, require additional measures to be taken.
156. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 18.
157. 597 F.2d at 1070. In his dissent, Judge Engel also concluded that "[tihe overriding truth
remains that the racial identifiability of TSU has thus far impaired its attractiveness to white
applicants." Id. at 1077.
158. See Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
159. In the depositions of several witnesses, factors involved in the attendance pattern at TSU
and UT-N became clear. Because of the effects of racial dualism, many whites took courses at
UT-N at night rather than at TSU, even when the latter's program was objectively superior. Brief
for Appellee supra note 5, at 23. One of the defendants' expert witnesses testified that over the
years the racial identifications of the schools had become fixed in the minds of citizens. These
identifications had become a larger factor in student choice than the actual programs offered by
the schools. Id. at 24.
160. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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bringing UT-N into direct competition with TSU. Milliken does not
apply to the facts of this case because both UT and TSU are instrumen-
talities of the state with state-wide jurisdiction, not truly independent
political entities exerting jurisdiction over adjacent districts. 16
Considering the Geier record, there was a strong basis for finding a
constitutional violation. Once the district court had determined that
such a violation existed, the court possessed broad equitable powers to
fashion a remedy. 162 Although there can be no doubt that the merger
order was within the district court's discretion, some of the assumptions
underlying its imposition should be examined.
The first assumption to consider is that the merger will, in fact,
contribute to the dismantlement of the dual system of higher education.
Although TSU, as a result of the merger, will have a substantial
number of white students enrolled in its newly acquired evening divi-
sion, there is no assurance that the full-time, day division will achieve
any greater degree of integration. Judge Engel, in his dissent, pointed
out that one cannot compel a white college student to attend a school
which he identifies as black,1 63 and there is little to suggest that TSU's
day program will lose that identification. Certainly, the head count of
students at TSU will show a sizeable percentage of white students and,
to that extent, the school's overall racial makeup will be altered. The
question remains, however, as to whether this constitutes meaningful
desegregation in the sense of fostering integration within the day divi-
sion. Achieving desegregation by such means may well be a classic
example of form over substance.
Another of the court's assumptions is related to the idea that TSU
was "the heart of the dual system." 164 The court expressed belief that
the merger remedy it imposed would result in further progress being
made state-wide in eliminating the vestiges of segregation from the
other virtually all white, public universities in Tennessee. 65 It is diffi-
cult to understand the logic of the court's reasoning when it suggests
that an increased white presence at TSU will result in an increased
black presence at other universities. There is no indication that the
court expected any of TSU's black students to be displaced to other
schools by the influx of white students. On the contrary, TSU, as a
161. See text accompanying notes 112-14 supra.
162. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
163. 597 F.2d at 1074.
164. See note 100 supra and accompanying text. See also Richardson v. Blanton, 597 F.2d
1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1979).
165. 597 F.2d at 1071.
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consequence of the merger, will have the added resources and physical
plant of UT-N and, therefore, would not appear to be forced to turn
away black applicants.
If the court had been concerned solely with eliminating the ves-
tiges of the dual system, one may question why a remedy involving
greater integration of TSU and other nearby state universities was not
considered. 166 Within a forty mile commuter radius of Nashville, there
were two predominantly white colleges offering full-time day pro-
grams.1 67 It would seem that through plans such as faculty sharing,
exclusive program allocations, or establishment of attendance zones, to
name only a few, considerably greater progress towards creating a uni-
tary system of higher education might have occurred. Clearly, how-
ever, the focus of the court was on Nashville itself and the competition
between the two universities, 168 as well as on the future viability of
TSU.
A third assumption is that without desegregation, TSU would con-
tinue to deteriorate as an institution of higher education.1 69 Evidently,
this was one of the reasons why the merger was finally imposed, al-
though during the years between 1968 and 1976, enrollment at TSU
increased from approximately 4,500 to 6,138.170 As Judge Gray stated:
"It is clearly apparent on the record that something must be done for
that school and that the one thing that is absolutely essential is a sub-
stantial desegregation of that institution." 171 Unfortunately, the district
court never discussed what was so "clearly apparent" to it, nor the basis
for concluding that a predominantly black university could not remain
viable. The Sixth Circuit noted Judge Gray's deterioration theory, but
166. UT never suggested such a remedy during the nine-year litigation prior to the appeal
despite the order in Geier v. Dunn, 337 F. Supp. 573 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), to consider curriculum
consolidation. LIT, however, did propose for the first time in its appellate brief an alternate rem-
edy of geographical assignment of students attending schools in the area. The Sixth Circuit did
not respond to the proposal. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 59 n. 139.
167. The schools were Austin Peay State University and Middle Tennessee State University.
See The Affirmative Duty to Integrate, supra note 13, at 694 n.133.
168. In the companion case of Richardson v. Blanton, 597 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1979), Judge
Lively stated: "The court and the original plaintiffs proceeded on the premise that the essential
first step in achieving a unitary system must occur in Nashville." Id. at 1083.
169. In the 1968 Sanders opinion, Judge Gray stated:
I have been concerned by a fact that clearly appears from the record, although it was not
specifically commented on by any witness, that the failure to make A & I [TSU] a viable,
desegregated institution in the near future is going to lead to its continued deterioration
as an institution of higher learning. I think everybody recognizes that.
Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937, 943 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
170. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 20.
171. 288 F. Supp. at 943.
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made no comment upon it.172 One might speculate that both courts
believed that as opportunities for blacks to attend other state schools
expand, TSU would become less attractive and lose enrollment. If this
were the case, then, arguably, the problem of the dual system would
eventually be eliminated by black students freely choosing the schools
they wish to attend. By linking the prospect of TSU's deterioration to
the insufficiency of its white enrollment, the district court implied that
black schools must have white students to remain viable. This is an
astonishing presumption and one which the court ought not to have left
unexplained.
Perhaps the best way to understand the imposition of the merger
of the two universities under the direction of the TSU governing board
is to recognize the dilemma facing both the district and Sixth Circuit
courts in the Geier litigation. One of the most perplexing problems fac-
ing any court dealing with historically black public universities is how
to satisfy the constitutional requirements for desegregation without en-
dangering the valued cultural, psychological, and remedial aspects of
these schools. 173 The threat to the existence of black colleges under
desegregation plans is very real, and cognizance of the problem has
made the formulation of these plans all the more difficult. Experience
has shown that when a state abolishes black colleges as a means of
dismantling a dual system, many black students may be unable to gain
admittance to other schools.174
Concern for the unique role of the traditionally black institutions
of higher education was expressed in a series of decisions 75 in connec-
tion with a lawsuit brought to require HEW to take action to enforce
provisions of title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 176 with respect to
172. 597 F.2d at 1059-60.
173. For a discussion of the role of black colleges, see The Affirmative Duty to Integrate, supra
note 13, at 676-81.
174. The abolishment of the black junior colleges in Florida in the early 1960's resulted in a
marked decline of black students attending the new consolidated junior college system. Id. at 677-
78.
175. See Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.) (ordering HEW to take enforcement
action), afl'd, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (affirming the order but directing HEW to obtain
acceptable desegregation plans before beginning enforcement proceedings); Adams v. Califano,
430 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977) (a second supplemental order rejecting state plans as not in com-
pliance with title VI and ordering HEW to publish desegregation criteria).
176. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Under title VI, HEW is required to attempt to secure voluntary compli-
ance after a determination has been made that the vestiges of segregation in public higher educa-
tion have not been eliminated by a state. If voluntary compliance is not forthcoming, HEW is
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public universities. In one of these cases, Adams v. Richardson,177 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
indicated that an appropriate statewide plan for the desegregation of
universities must take into consideration the special problems of minor-
ity students and of black colleges which fulfill a crucial need and play a
significant role in the higher education of black students. 178
In response to a court order arising out of the Adams litigation, 79
HEW published in 1978, for the first time, desegregation guidelines for
higher education.18 0 The guidelines state that desegregation plans must
take into account the unique importance of black colleges and reflect
an awareness that the transition to a unitary system must not be accom-
plished by disproportionately burdening black students, faculty, or in-
stitutions. 181
Although concern for the special role and value of black colleges
was not specifically discussed by the Geier majority, this issue had been
brought to the attention of the Sixth Circuit.8 2 Certainly, it had been a
factor in Judge Gray's district court order as evidenced by his state-
ment of the "concomitant losses" that would result if TSU were elimi-
nated as a school via merger with UT-N under the auspices of the
University of Tennessee Board of Trustees. 83 Judge Gray also had
noted the HEW litigation which cautioned against sacrificing black in-
stitutions to the goal of desegregating public higher education. ' 8 4
The recognition of the significance of TSU's future viability gives
rise to the fourth assumption underlying the merger order: that merger,
in fact, will serve as a means of preserving that institution's role. There
can be little doubt that this assumption is well-founded. TSU, as a
consequence of the merger, has at its disposal UT-N's resources in
terms of physical plant, academic programs, and faculty-in addition
to funds generated by the rapidly expanding evening division. TSU's
required to seek enforcement administratively or through the courts. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1976);
45 C.F.R. §§ 80.7(d)(1), 80.8 (1979).
177. 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
178. Id. at 1165.
179. See Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977).
180. 43 Fed. Reg. 6658 (1978). These guidelines took special note of the opinions delivered by
the district court in the Geier litigation. Id. at 6660.
181. See id. Other major ingredients of an acceptable desegregation plan would include: (1) a
statewide approach to the problem as mandated in Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1164-65
(D.C. Cir. 1973); (2) the establishment of numerical goals and timetables to serve as indices by
which to measure progress; and (3) the development of special plans tailored to fit the special
characteristics of higher educational institutions.
182. See Judge Engel's dissenting opinion, 597 F.2d at 1075 n.9.
183. Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644, 660 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
184. Id. at 650 n.14.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
black identity is not jeopardized by the merger. An increased white
presence in the day division is likely to be gradual, and the school
should be able to continue to serve the needs of its black students at the
same time as it broadens its appeal and attracts greater numbers of
white students. TSU's position assuredly has been enhanced, and the
goal that it may become a major integrated urban university now ap-
pears feasible.
Whether the court's assumptions concerning the effects of the
Nashville merger are substantially accurate insofar as they point to an
increase in integration state-wide and a meaningfully integrated stu-
dent body at TSU, the fact remains that TSU has been greatly strength-
ened. The Sixth Circuit's affirmance of the merger was an appropriate
and important decision because in the process of remedying a blatant
constitutional violation, the court did not place an undue burden on the
black institution nor did it sacrifice TSU's significant function within
the public university system of Tennessee.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GEIER v UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE
DECISION
Geier is the first federal appellate decision to affirm an order to
desegregate an historically black, public university. 85 By upholding
the "drastic" remedy of merger, the Sixth Circuit set an example that
might well motivate other states with dual systems of higher education
to critically examine their affirmative duties with an eye towards devel-
oping meaningful and workable desegregation programs of their own.
Geier demonstrates that the courts will act forcefully if the appropriate
state educational authorities are indecisive or unwilling to act.
At the present time, ten states 18 6 have been cited by HEW's Office
for Civil Rights as continuing to operate segregated systems of higher
education in violation of title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The
Geier decision provides considerable incentive for states to submit ac-
ceptable plans to HEW, under the recently published guidelines, if they
wish to avoid a court imposed remedy. Geier also provides an impor-
tant precedent for seeking affirmative relief directly under the four-
teenth amendment, in addition to the relief afforded under title VI now
that desegregation criteria have been promulgated. 87
185. See Brief for Appellee, 5upra note 5, at 27 n.97.
186. The ten states are: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. 43 Fed. Reg. 6658, 6658 n.2. (1978).
187. It should be noted that the original Geier litigation was brought under title VI as well as
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 48 n.134.
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There are presently fifteen black public colleges in other southern
and border states which have situations similar to the one in Nashville:
a history of de jure segregation and a black public college located in the
same geographic area as another public college, predominantly white,
with which it competes for students. 188 The Geier decision has special
relevance for these schools although due to the increasing concern for
the viability of black colleges, one might not expect to find a merger
order where, due to size or program limitations, it would be the black
school that would logically be merged into the white.
CONCLUSION
Twenty-six years after Brown, the courts are still actively involved
in school desegregation issues. Concerned with both the viability of a
black university and the constitutional mandate to eliminate the ves-
tiges of state-imposed segregation, the Geier court affirmed a "radical"
solution that ordered the merger of two unviersities in the Nashville
area in an effort to eliminate vestiges of a dual system. The Sixth Cir-
cuit found that the repeated failures of a state, through its instrumental-
ities, to effectively desegregate its institutions of higher learning was a
continuing constitutional violation; that a state's affirmative duty is as
exacting in higher education as in elementary and secondary; and that
the actions of UT in expanding the program at UT-N perpetuated seg-
regation by impeding desegregation of TSU. As a result, the district
court's order merging the two institutions was upheld.
From the time of the AST4' 89 decision, attention began to focus
on the duty to dismantle dual systems of higher education. The Nash-
ville litigation, culminating in Geier, plays an important role in defin-
ing the scope of this duty as well as the power of the courts to fashion
remedies in an area where deference to state control over higher educa-
tional policies had become the established practice. The message is
clear: states must take affirmative measures to effectively desegregate
Neither the district court nor Sixth Circuit discussed the statute. The courts decided the issue
solely on the basis of the constitutional violation. This was possibly due to the fact that in 1968 no
actions concerning dual systems of higher education had ever been brought under title VI, and the
extent of the duty to desegregate at the university level was uncertain.
188. Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 26-27. As of 1976, eleven of these historically black
public colleges were more than 90 percent black; three were between 80 percent and 89 percent
black; and one was 71.2 percent black. Id. at 27 n.96. See id. at Addendum C, p. 75A for the
enrollment in each of these situations and a comparison with their predominantly white competi-
tors.
189. Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Schools & College Auth., 289 F. Supp.
784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), arff'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969).
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the remnants of their dual university systems, or the courts will do it for
them.
GAIL M. EPSTEIN
